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FINANCING 
Political Parties  
in the United Kingdom
Jacob Rowbottom
Election finance in the UK has been 
regulated since the Victorian era. The 
controls on election spending have 
their roots in the Corrupt and Illegal 
Practices Act 1883, which was the first 
statute to impose a limit on the amount 
that candidates can spend during their 
campaigns. That law attempted to combat 
problems of bribing and treating voters by 
capping the amounts spent. While subject 
to amendment, this legal framework for 
regulating election spending remained 
in place during the 20th century. These 
controls limited only spending in relation 
to specific candidates and did not cap 
spending to promote the election of a 
political party generally. 
As election campaigns became 
increasingly centralised and focused on 
the national party, the shortcomings of the 
framework became obvious. An indirect 
control on spending by political parties at 
the national level was, however, achieved 
through the regulation of the broadcast 
media, which prohibited paid advertising 
for political messages. Denying political 
parties the option of spending money on 
television advertisements, often a major 
expense in other jurisdictions, helped to 
restrain the cost of elections.
The regulatory framework was subject 
to a major overhaul in the Political 
Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 
2000 (PPERA). This legislation sought to 
address concerns about an ‘arms race’ of 
economic resources between the major 
political parties and the dependence on 
large donors. The PPERA introduced 
spending limits for political parties in 
the campaign period, which were added 
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to the existing restrictions on candidate 
spending. It also brought about greater 
transparency by requiring the disclosure 
of donations to political parties and 
registered third parties above a certain 
threshold. At the time of writing, the 
British framework for regulating political 
finance includes:
• limits on electoral expenditures during 
the campaign period by candidates, 
political parties and third parties;
• disclosure of donations above a 
specified amount to parties, candidates 
and registered third parties;
• a ban on all political advertising in the 
broadcast media.
Even with these measures in place, 
the PPERA has not ended the concerns 
about party funding in the UK. The last 
decade has seen numerous scandals and 
controversies surrounding donations to 
political parties. Most notable has been the 
‘loans for peerages’ controversy, in which it 
was alleged that donations and loans to the 
Labour Party had secured nominations for 
honours. Other controversies have focused 
on allegations that donations secured 
government contracts and of donations 
being channelled through intermediaries 
to avoid the transparency rules. Even 
where the donors have been cleared of 
any wrongdoing after investigation, such 
episodes have fuelled speculation and led 
to further calls for reform of the party 
funding laws.
The continuing controversy need not 
be seen as a failure of existing laws, but as 
a sign of some success. Making the parties’ 
sources of income more transparent will 
often generate suspicion that a donor 
received a political favour in return for the 
contribution. The legislative framework is 
also complex and detailed, which means 
there are now more rules for politicians to 
fall foul of and consequently controversies 
are more likely to arise. For example, 
media attention often focuses on whether 
a donation was properly disclosed to 
the Electoral Commission or whether a 
permissible donor made the donation. 
Prior to the PPERA, politicians were under 
no legal duty to disclose donations and 
allegations about the sources of funding 
relied simply on political argument rather 
than on a specific legal provision. That the 
PPERA has resulted in a proliferation of 
party funding scandals is unsurprising, 
and may be a sign that it has raised 
ethical standards and expectations rather 
than reflecting a decline in politicians’ 
integrity.
If the New Zealand reform proposals 
are enacted, the British experience suggests 
that the controversies and concerns will 
continue for as long as parties rely on 
private sources of funding. Reforms are 
likely to be followed by calls for more 
reform. This is not, however, an argument 
for inaction. Public ignorance would have 
avoided the scandals and speculation over 
the last decade, but the democratic process 
would have been worse off for it. With 
this background in mind, the remainder 
of this article will look at some of specific 
difficulties that have arisen in the British 
system. To do this, the various types of 
regulation will be discussed in turn.
Spending limits
The UK has two tiers of spending control. 
The first tier applies to spending by 
candidates and the second tier to political 
parties. The spending limits for political 
parties are in place for the 12 months prior 
to a general election, and four months 
prior to elections for devolved assemblies 
and the European Parliament. In the case 
of general elections this obviously creates 
some uncertainty, as the date of the election 
is normally announced weeks prior to the 
polling day. This currently gives the party 
in government an advantage (given its 
power to dissolve parliament), as it will 
be able to plan its finances knowing the 
election date in advance. By contrast, 
opposition parties lack this advance 
knowledge and may therefore be caught 
off-guard by a snap election. An opposition 
party that mistakenly anticipates an 
election being called on a particular day 
may also deplete its resources campaigning 
for an election that is not called. The 
new coalition government’s proposal for 
fixed-term parliaments in the UK should, 
however, address these concerns.
The overall limit on party spending 
varies according to the number of seats 
being contested. In the 2010 general 
election, the maximum amount that could 
be spent by a political party contesting all 
632 seats in Great Britain was £18.96 million. 
The cap has been subject to criticism from 
some quarters on the grounds that it is set 
too high and still allows for an arms race 
between parties. Consequently, some have 
called for the maximum expenditure limit 
to be reduced to £15 million. Another line 
of criticism is that the limits apply only 
in the year prior to an election. While a 
12-month regulated period seems lengthy, 
calls have been made to extend the 
controls and impose annual caps on party 
spending outside election years. This 
would curtail pre-election spending by 
parties which can arguably have a greater 
long-term impact on voters. 
The second tier of spending controls is 
imposed on the candidates, who are limited 
to spending £7,150 plus an additional 7 or 
5 pence for each person on the electoral 
roll in the constituency. The limits on 
candidate election expenses are applicable 
for a shorter period of time, namely from 
the dissolution of parliament, leaving a 
campaign period of roughly four weeks. 
The dual tiers of regulation created 
some complexity and led to a number of 
difficulties (Rowbottom, 2010, pp.117-212). 
First, the line between candidate and party 
spending is difficult to draw, as activities 
to support a party can benefit candidates 
and vice versa. It can therefore be unclear 
under which set of spending limits an 
item of campaign expenditure should fall, 
and campaigners are advised to consult 
the Electoral Commission for guidance. 
Secondly, the short duration of the 
regulated period for candidate spending 
provided an incentive for higher spending 
to take place in key constituencies prior 
to the dissolution of parliament. The 
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significance of this trend is underlined 
by research from political scientists 
highlighting the importance of local 
activity to electoral outcomes (Johnston 
and Pattie, 2010). To address the concern 
that large sums were being channelled to 
marginal constituencies shortly before an 
election was called, a new set of spending 
limits was enacted in 2009 to cap candidate 
spending in the months prior to the 
dissolution of parliament (the so-called 
‘long campaign’).1 
Third-party spending limits
The controls on political party spending 
would be undermined if third parties 
could spend without restraint. To prevent 
political money being channelled to groups 
other than the formal political parties, 
spending limits are applied to third-party 
campaigns. Like the party spending limits, 
there is a two-tier system, with one set of 
limits on campaigning in support of the 
party and another on campaigning for a 
particular candidate. 
Third parties that wish to spend over 
£10,000 in England or over £5,000 in 
Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland on 
‘election material’ during a regulated 
campaign period must register with the 
Electoral Commission. Spending by 
registered third parties in the 12 months 
before a general election is capped 
at £793,500 in England, £108,000 for 
Scotland, £60,000 in Wales and £27,000 
in Northern Ireland. Two or more third 
parties working together in a campaign 
cannot aggregate their spending limits, 
and the spending by all the third parties 
on a co-ordinated campaign would count 
towards the expenditure limit of each. 
For the third-party controls, ‘election 
material’ is defined as material ‘which 
can reasonably be regarded as intended’ 
to ‘promote or procure the electoral 
success’ or ‘enhance the standing’ in an 
election of a political party, or of parties 
and candidates who ‘advocate (or do 
not advocate) particular policies’. The 
promotion of a party’s electoral success 
or standing also includes ‘prejudicing the 
electoral prospects at the election of other 
parties or candidates’ or ‘prejudicing the 
standing with the electorate of other 
parties or candidates’ (PPERA, s.85). As 
a result, the provision covers negative 
campaigning by candidates. To count as 
‘election material’, a publication need 
not expressly refer to a political party or 
candidate (s.85(4)). Guidance published 
by the Electoral Commission states 
that material campaigning on a policy 
which happens to be associated with one 
political party counts as ‘election material’, 
as does material ‘publicising the names of 
candidates who have a particular view on 
an issue such as hunting or education’ 
(Electoral Commission, 2010, para 2.5). 
Consequently, there is no ‘magic words’ 
requirement to distinguish electoral 
expression from ordinary political 
speech. The controls do not apply to 
communications to members within an 
organisation, ‘provided that the material 
relates to an issue within the aims or 
objectives of the organisation’ (Electoral 
Commission, 2010, para 3.8). A union 
sending material to its members assessing 
a party’s industrial relations policy would 
not therefore fall within the controls. 
In relation to expenditures in support 
of a particular candidate, third parties can 
spend only £500 in the formal campaign 
period (beginning with the dissolution of 
parliament) (Representation of the People 
Act 1983, s.75). An earlier version of the 
law had limited third-party expenditures 
to £5, but was found to violate the right 
to freedom of expression under article 10 
of the European Convention on Human 
Rights in 1999.2
In addition to the spending controls, 
registered third parties (i.e. those going 
over the £5,000 or £10,000 spending 
threshold) have to disclose donations 
received of over £7,500 from a single 
source that are made to pay for the election 
material. Donations to a third party that 
go into general funds and are not to be 
used for campaigning do not have to be 
disclosed. One question is how easily 
can that line be drawn? The third parties 
do not have to make donations out of a 
segregated political fund, so it may not 
always be clear which donations have been 
given to cover the cost of election material. 
As of June 2010, only 21 donations to third 
parties have been disclosed to the Electoral 
Commission since 2001. The transparency 
regime therefore sheds a small amount of 
light on who bankrolls the third parties.
Currently, there are only 32 registered 
third parties, consisting largely of pressure 
groups and trade unions.  At the 2005 
general election, 25 registered third 
parties submitted returns for electoral 
expenditures, of which two spent over 
£100,000 (the trade union Unison spent 
£682,115 and the Rural Action Group spent 
£550,370). The total amount spent by all 
registered third parties in 2005 totalled £1.7 
million. While it may have been thought 
that caps on political party spending would 
encourage more sums to be channelled to 
independent bodies, the experience so far 
shows that this has not been a significant 
problem. One explanation may be that 
the caps on party spending are sufficiently 
generous that such strategies are not 
necessary. Alternatively, it may be that 
much political spending by third parties 
does not count as ‘election material’ and 
thereby falls outside the controls. 
There is much independent activity 
that appears to take place outside the 
third-party controls, three examples 
of which will be given here. The first is 
political campaigning by newspapers and 
broadcasters, which are exempt from the 
controls. While broadcasters are subject to 
legal regulation requiring news and politics 
to be covered with ‘due impartiality’, 
newspapers are free to engage in partisan 
advocacy. In Britain there is a long history 
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of the national press having partisan 
attachments and seeking to influence 
elections. The press thereby occupies a 
privileged position, which allows it to use 
its resources to influence an election in a 
way that would not be permitted of any 
other organisation. 
The second example is policy work by 
think tanks, which can play an influential 
role in election campaigns and in political 
debate more generally. The think tanks 
are independent entities, but clearly 
have political effects by promoting 
particular issues and producing research 
that may support a party’s stance and 
lend it some credibility from seemingly 
independent experts. For example, the 
Institute of Public Policy Research is a 
registered charity, but is often seen as a 
testing ground for Labour Party ideas. 
The Taxpayers’ Alliance, a charity which 
campaigns for lower public spending 
and taxation, has become increasingly 
influential in Britain and receives much 
media attention. While maintaining its 
independence, it is often associated in the 
press with the Conservative Party. 
Although think tanks are not formally 
exempt from electoral finance controls, 
much of what they produce will not count 
as ‘election material’ and thereby falls 
outside the ambit of regulation. In such 
circumstances the think tank does not 
have to disclose donations received. This 
means that think tanks can provide an 
ideal location for political funds where the 
donor does not want his or her identity 
to be disclosed. In one recent lobbying 
scandal, a former minister advised an 
undercover journalist posing as a lobbyist 
to donate money to a think tank as a 
way of securing access to ministers, but 
without attracting public attention. 
A third example is political activity 
on the internet, which is an increasingly 
important way that third parties can 
influence an election campaign. While 
outside the formal party organisation, 
many political blogs and websites 
have a party allegiance. Most notably, 
ConservativesHome is a website aiming to 
provide a forum for grassroots members, 
founded by Tim Montgomery, a former 
Conservative Party aide, and in 2009 Lord 
Ashcroft (a leading party donor) bought 
a majority stake in the site. LabourList is 
a forum for Labour Party activists which 
is funded through donations, sponsorship 
and advertisements. Similarly, Left 
Foot Forward provides a forum for 
‘progressives’. According to the website it 
is non-partisan, but the title of the blog 
suggests where its loyalties lie and it was 
launched with help from the Labour Party 
members’ organisation Progress and from 
some Labour Party donors. 
In addition to this, many leading 
individual bloggers have links with 
the political parties. The websites are 
not, however, covered by the same 
exemption that applies to broadcasters 
and newspapers. Consequently, some of 
the spending by these websites that are 
engaged in electoral campaigning could 
potentially come within the third-party 
spending limits. It is not clear whether 
the various online campaigners will spend 
enough on election material to require 
registration. However, those larger sites 
that employ one or more people full time 
could well meet the threshold.
Donations
Donations above a certain threshold 
to the political parties, registered third 
parties and other regulated bodies have to 
be disclosed to the Electoral Commission 
(PPERA, s.62).3 For donations to a 
central political party, the threshold is 
£7,500. Donations must be made by 
a ‘permissible donor’, which includes 
companies, unincorporated associations 
and trade unions, as well as individuals 
on the electoral register (s.54). The 2000 
Act provides that where there is an agency 
relationship, in which one person receives 
money to be passed on as a donation to 
the party, the identity of the original 
source of funds must be disclosed. The 
register of donors to political parties 
and third parties can be accessed on the 
Electoral Commission website and aims 
to promote transparency by revealing 
the sources of income. By making such 
information public, the hope is that deals 
between donors and politicians will be 
discouraged, given the threat of adverse 
publicity. 
The regulation of donations has, 
however, faced a number of difficulties 
where devices can be used to evade 
the spirit if not the letter of the law. 
First, and most notably, in the ‘cash 
for honours’ scandal individuals gave 
funds to political parties as loans, not as 
donations. Under the original terms of the 
PPERA, commercial loans did not have 
to be disclosed. Much debate at the time 
concerned whether the loans given by the 
individuals were really on commercial 
terms. However, the law has since been 
amended so that commercial loans also 
have to be disclosed (PPERA, part IVA).
A second area of controversy concerns 
donations given by institutions. Com-
panies that carry on business in the UK 
and unincorporated associations whose 
activities are based in the UK can donate 
money to a political party (PPERA, s.54).4 
In the absence of an agency agreement, the 
company or unincorporated association 
is recorded as the donor. This means that 
while an individual who is not on the 
electoral register cannot make a donation, 
a UK-based company owned by that 
individual can give money. Institutions 
can also undermine the transparency 
requirements, as it may not be known who 
or which interests are behind the company 
or association making the donation. This 
problem was to some extent addressed 
by a requirement that an unincorporated 
association disclose donations it receives 
of over £7,500.5 However, concerns about 
transparency still arise in relation to 
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companies, which do not have to disclose 
their sources of income. 
The UK does not impose a limit on 
the amounts that can be donated to a 
political party. At the time of the PPERA’s 
enactment it was thought a donation cap 
would be too great an interference with the 
freedom of parties or donors, and that the 
spending caps would curtail the demand 
for money in any event. This relaxed 
approach to donations did not last and 
the absence of a donation limit has been 
the cause of much controversy in the last 
decade. Individuals have made a number 
of very large donations, some in excess 
of £1 million. Institutions have also made 
large donations. For example, in 2005 the 
company 5th Avenue Partners gave £2.4 
million to the Liberal Democrats; between 
2003 and 2009 Lord Ashcroft’s company 
Bearwood Corporate Services donated 
over £5 million to the Conservative Party; 
and between 2007 and 2009 the trade 
union Unite donated over £11 million to 
the Labour Party. 
The major political parties are 
committed to some reform of donations, 
at least to the extent of considering 
whether a cap should be imposed. Yet 
if such a cap is introduced there will be 
difficult questions about the level at which 
it should be set, how it should apply to 
institutions, and how the techniques 
of evasion can be avoided. These issues 
of detail and design are likely to be the 
main barriers to an agreement on reform 
among the parties and have been the main 
sticking points in previous negotiations. 
Broadcasting
All broadcasters, both publicly and 
privately owned, are required to cover 
politics and current affairs with ‘due 
impartiality’ (Geddis, 2010). A stricter 
set of rules applies in the context of an 
election, where the broadcasters have to 
go to greater lengths to treat parties and 
candidates fairly. Political advertising in 
the broadcast media is prohibited. The ban 
is broader than its New Zealand equivalent 
and prohibits advertisements ‘directed 
towards a political end’, and by anybody 
‘whose objects are wholly or mainly of a 
political nature’ (Communications Act 
2003, s.321). Consequently, it applies to 
all political groups and not just parties 
and candidates, and it applies to political 
messages generally, as opposed to just 
electoral messages. 
The ban has come under criticism from 
a number of academic commentators, in 
particular in the light of two rulings from 
the European Court of Human Rights 
which found similar bans in Switzerland 
and Norway to be in violation of the right 
to freedom of expression under article 10 
of the European Convention.6 However, in 
2008 the House of Lords declined to declare 
the ban incompatible with the European 
Convention.7 Unlike the Strasbourg 
Court, the House of Lords found a ban to 
be a proportionate measure to protect the 
integrity of the electoral process. While 
upholding the legislation, two of the lords 
expressed a willingness to consider future 
challenges to the application of the ban, 
for example where it has a discriminatory 
effect. This might arguably arise where 
the ban prevents a political group, such 
as an environmental organisation, from 
advertising in response to a commercial 
advertisement by an oil company. 
Aside from the ban, political parties are 
entitled to free time on the public service 
broadcasters. In a general election, at 
least one broadcast is allocated to parties 
contesting one sixth or more of the seats 
up for election. While this allows parties 
with no MPs to access the mass media, 
the larger political parties are normally 
allocated more slots on television and 
there have been (albeit unsuccessful) legal 
complaints that the smaller parties are 
treated unfairly. 
The televised debates between the 
leaders of the three main political parties, 
held for the first time in 2010, added a new 
dimension to the issue. The debates proved 
to be the most high profile campaign 
‘event’ and played a central role in giving 
the Liberal Democrats greater exposure. 
Unsurprisingly, the smaller parties argued 
that the broadcasters’ inclusion of the 
leaders of only the Labour, Conservative 
and Liberal Democrat parties was a breach 
of the impartiality obligations. However, 
when faced with that argument, a Scottish 
court declined to issue an injunction 
restraining the broadcast of the third 
leaders’ debate a week before the election.8 
This type of issue is one faced whenever 
a subsidy, in this case media access, is to 
be allocated among political speakers 
and raises difficult questions about the 
appropriate threshold for inclusion. 
Parliamentary funding 
The central issue with parliamentary 
funding in the last year has been the 
expenses scandal, in which the Daily 
Telegraph published leaked details of 
the expenses claimed by MPs. Following 
this, the system for allowances has been 
reformed and a number of MPs have been 
found to be in breach of the rules and 
have made repayments. A small number 
have also faced criminal prosecution. 
Possibly the biggest effect has been the 
political backlash, with a large number of 
MPs standing down at the 2010 election. 
While the expenses scandal focused on 
allegations that MPs had gained personally 
through the expenses, there have also been 
concerns about parliamentary funds being 
channelled to political parties.
One way parliamentary funds can end 
up in a party treasury is by the allowance for 
an MP’s office being used to rent space from 
the party headquarters in the constituency. 
In November 2009, the Committee on 
Standards in Public Life concluded that 
such a practice should not be prohibited, as 
there was little evidence of abuse.  Instead, 
such arrangements are now subject to an 
audit by a qualified independent assessor 
to ensure the market rate for the premises 
is not exceeded.10 While this ensures that 
public funds are not misused, the practice 
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does give the party with a sitting MP a 
regular source of income. 
A second route is through the 
use of parliamentary allowances for 
communications to voters. MPs have 
allowances for informing constituents and 
replying to messages. The rules provide 
that such allowances are not to be used 
for partisan purposes. For example, party 
logos and slogans should not be used in 
material funded through the allowances. 
However, the line between an MP 
informing constituents of his or her work 
and the use of such resources to persuade 
or promote his or her re-election is a 
difficult one to draw. Political references 
will sometimes be necessary to explain a 
particular stance to a constituent, and even 
those communications that merely raise 
the MP’s profile potentially contribute to 
a re-election campaign.11 
Third, there is a practice known as 
‘tithing’, in which MPs and councillors 
are asked to contribute a percentage of 
their salary to their political party. This 
is not an improper use of public funds, 
as it is merely a donation coming from 
the representative’s salary (albeit that it 
is demanded by the party as a condition 
of membership). However, like the use 
of communications allowances, this 
approach means that parties that are 
already in power attract further resources, 
which help them stay in power. The 
danger is that such practices can reinforce 
the status quo. 
These issues are connected with a 
much broader issue about the advantages 
enjoyed by incumbents. There are many 
rules stating that government property and 
resources should not be used for ‘political 
purposes’, yet it is difficult to define just 
what these are. For example, inevitably 
some partisan points will be made at a 
ministerial press conference. Similarly, 
the use of civil servants in developing 
government policies will provide an 
advantage when defending those policies 
in the electoral arena. It is likely that 
incumbents will also receive greater media 
attention in the coverage of political 
events. The benefits of being in office are 
thus very hard to regulate through any 
strict rules. While it is important to police 
the system to avoid clear abuses, a fair 
process may also require that opposition 
parties and those not elected receive some 
support to offset some of the advantages 
of incumbency.12
Conclusion
The controls on political donations and 
party expenditures in Britain have not yet 
been in force for a decade, but have been 
subject to regular revision. Part of this 
relates to the complexity and technical 
nature of election regulations. Unforeseen 
problems inevitably emerge once a new 
framework is in place and loopholes 
need to be closed. The complexity is not 
helped by the new framework having 
been superimposed on the longstanding 
candidate expenditure limits that were 
introduced in the Victorian era. However, 
the calls for reform are not just due to 
difficulties in design, but are also based 
on policy considerations. These include 
demands to cap donations to parties and 
to extend the spending limits to cap party 
expenditures on an annual basis. These 
demands have largely been fuelled by 
the numerous scandals, which have often 
come to light as a result of the increased 
transparency in the UK’s political 
funding. 
While regulations are a necessary 
and important part of a fair process, 
one lesson from the UK is that there are 
limits to what such legal controls can 
achieve. The law is targeted at electoral 
activities, which are just one part of 
political process. Even with these rules in 
place, considerable power still lies with 
those who control the infrastructure of 
political communications, such as the 
mass media and the think tanks, which 
provide a channel for economic resources 
to influence politics outside the legal 
regulations. All the main political parties 
promised reform in their 2010 election 
manifestos and the new government may 
have the political capital to push through 
a new set of reforms, just as Labour did 
in its early years. Yet even if it does, it is 
unlikely that the issue will go away.  
1 Spending by individual candidates in the five months prior 
to the dissolution of parliament is now limited to £25,000, 
with an additional sum for each person on the electoral roll 
in the constituency. The long campaign limits come into 
effect after the parliament has been sitting for four years and 
seven months. If an election is called much earlier, then the 
pre-campaign limits do not apply. 
2 Bowman v UK (1998), 26 EHRR 1. See also R v Holding 
[2005], EWCA Crim 3185. 
3 This includes a series of smaller donations given over the 
same year, the aggregate of which exceeds the threshold. 
4 Companies must be registered under the Companies Act 
2006 and incorporated in the EU. 
5 If the association is to make donations of over £25,000 in a 
year. 
6 VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v Switzerland (2002), 34 
EHRR 4 and TV Vest As & Rogaland Pensjonistparti v 
Norway (2008), 48 EHRR 120.
7 R (on the application of Animal Defenders International) 
v Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport [2008] 
UKHL 15. 
8 Scottish National Party [2010], CSOH 56. However, 
compare Houston v BBC [1995], SC 433.
9 See the 12th report of the Committee on Standards in 
Public Life, MPs’ Expenses and Allowances (2009, Cm 
7724) at [7.14-15], finding that this issue requires further 
investigation before any further steps are taken. 
10 Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority, The MPs’ 
Expenses Scheme (2010, HC 501) at [9.7].
11 For discussion of the difficulties, see House of Commons 
Standards and Privileges Committee, Use of Pre-paid 
Envelopes and Official Stationery (HC 1211 2008). 
12 For example, opposition parties in parliament receive Short 
and Cranborne money, which recognises that some public 
funds should be allocated to offset some of the advantages of 
incumbency. 
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